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Abstract 
 
When Canada signed the Nunavut Land Claims 
Agreement in 1993, it committed to create a new 
territory, Nunavut, as an Inuit homeland in the 
Canadian Eastern Arctic. Parliament fulfilled 
this promise with the passage of the Nunavut 
Act, and the new territory came into existence on 
April 1, 1999. 
 
Still, the Government of Nunavut remains a 
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creature of statute and has only such powers as 
Parliament has devolved to it. To date, these 
devolved powers do not include jurisdiction over 
lands and resources. Nunavut is the only place 
in Canada where Canadian citizens may not 
elect a sub-national legislature empowered to 
make fundamental decisions about the land 
beneath their feet. 
 
This Article explores the impact of this 
citizenship gap on indigenous rights in Nunavut 
and on Canada's security posture in the Arctic. 
As the sea ice melts and as much as a trillion 
dollars of oil and gas becomes profitably 
extractable, decisions about natural resources 
will become a focus not only of Canada’s 
domestic politics, but also of its international 
engagement. With a comparatively weak military 
presence in the Arctic, Canadian sovereignty has 
been borne out primarily in the form of 
permanent settlement, and the Inuit have played 
the part of “human flagpoles” in federal 
Northern policy. This Article argues that 
devolution, as a means to Inuit self-government, 
must occur in tandem with assertions of 
Canadian sovereignty in the Far North. 
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INTRODUCTION: WHO OWNS CANADA? 
 
Who owns and who controls Canada’s resource riches—the 
federal government or the governments of Canada’s provinces, 
resource companies or local citizens? The question has polarized 
Canada’s politics for longer than the country has existed. For 
indigenous peoples—and for Nunavut, the federal territory that 
is the Inuit homeland in the Canadian Eastern Arctic—it is 
anything but settled. 
The struggle for jurisdiction over natural resources within 
the Canadian federation has been a long one. In 1905, when 
Prime Minister Wilfred Laurier created the provinces of 
Saskatchewan and Alberta from the prairie lands of the North 
West Territories, Canada retained control of their natural 
resources. It was not until 1930 that Prime Minister Mackenzie 
King devolved to the four Western provinces—Manitoba,3 
Saskatchewan,
4
 Alberta,
5
 and British Columbia
6—the same law-
making powers over resources enjoyed by their sister provinces 
to the east.
7
  
 “Since [Manitoba Métis leader] Louis Riel first pushed for 
resource control [in the late nineteenth century] as the key to his 
community’s destiny,” journalist Mary Janigan has argued, “the 
notion has been deeply embedded in the West’s identity and 
pride.”8 The same can be said for the Far North. The Inuit 
inhabitants of Nunavut are now seeking a deal like the one that 
the Western provinces secured in 1930: devolution of 
jurisdiction over lands and resources—and a substantial share of 
resource revenues—from the federal Parliament to their 
territorial legislature. Nunavut’s central, basic demand is 
                                                 
3 See Manitoba Natural Resources Act, S.C. 1930, c. 29 (Can.). 
4 See Saskatchewan Natural Resources Act, S.C. 1930, c. 41 (Can.). 
5 See Alberta Natural Resources Act, S.C. 1930, c. 3 (Can.). 
6 See Railway Belt and Peace River Block Act, S.C, 1930, c. 37 (Can.). 
7 See Constitution Act, 1930, 20 & 21 George V, c. 26 (U.K.). 
8  Mary Janigan, On the Rocky Road to a National Energy Strategy, 
GLOBE & MAIL, Dec. 1, 2012, 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/on-the-rocky-road-to-a-
national-energy-strategy/article5864015/. 
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essentially the same as the one that shaped the story of the 
Canadian West: local control. 
This Article argues that, without devolution, Nunavummiut
9
 
are caught in a “citizenship gap”—the unequal allocation of 
legislative powers among the constituent members of the 
Canadian federation. This citizenship gap is not only problematic 
under both domestic and international law, but it may also 
weaken Canada’s geostrategic position in the circumpolar world. 
This Article explains how. 
Part I describes the process of devolution to date, by which 
Canada’s federal government has transferred jurisdiction over 
lands and resources to new provinces—by constitutional 
amendment—and to new territories—by statute. It documents 
Nunavut’s failure to secure even a meaningful negotiation with 
the federal government during the entirety of the territory’s 
existence. Part II examines Nunavut’s territorial government 
through the prism of indigenous rights under Canadian and 
international law. It argues that devolution can achieve what the 
Inuit have sought for decades: meaningful self-government 
within the framework of Canadian federalism. Part III re-
examines devolution from the international perspective and with 
respect to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. It concludes that 
vindicating the indigenous rights of Nunavut’s Inuit inhabitants 
through devolution—and closing the citizenship gap in Canada’s 
North—is in Canada’s broader and long-term, strategic interest. 
 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF DEVOLUTION: THE CITIZENSHIP GAP 
 
Canada’s constitution divides law-making powers between 
the federal and provincial orders of government. Section 91 of 
the Constitution Act, 1867 enumerates the powers of the federal 
government,
10
 while Section 92 describes the areas of provincial 
jurisdiction, including—in Sections 92(5) and 92A—natural 
resources.
11
 But, unlike the ten southern provinces, Canada’s 
                                                 
9 “Nunavummiut” is the Inuktitut word that describes the inhabitants of 
Nunavut. See Definition of Nunavummiut in English, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/Nunavummiut.  
10 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 91 (U.K.). 
11 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, ss. 92(5) & 92A (U.K.). 
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three Northern territories have no constitutionally guaranteed 
legislative powers; instead, Yukon, the Northwest Territories, 
and Nunavut are all creatures of statute.
12
 Since the late 1980s—
and despite the failure of the 1987 Meech Lake Accord,
13
 which 
would have amended Canada’s Constitution to give the existing 
provinces a veto over the admission of any new provinces—it 
has become uncontroversial among Northern leaders to suggest 
that provincehood is not in the cards for any of Canada’s 
territories.
14
 For the foreseeable future, devolution of province-
like (or “province lite”) powers may be all there is for Canada’s 
Arctic and sub-Arctic territories.
15
 The constitutional trajectory 
traced by British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and 
Manitoba in the early twentieth century is unlikely ever to be 
repeated. Instead, devolution is all there is. 
In Yukon and the Northwest Territories, devolution is well 
underway. Under the Yukon Northern Affairs Program 
Devolution Transfer Agreement reached between the Yukon 
Territory and Canada in October 2001,
16
 the territorial 
government manages federal lands, which means that it can 
authorize the transfer of ownership of these lands to private 
hands, lease them, and license resource extraction on them.
17
 It 
can use and dispose of federal lands as though it were the owner. 
The Yukon Territory does not own the lands but, under federal 
legislation, it acts for the owner through lands and resource 
                                                 
12 Kirk Cameron & Alastair Campbell, The Devolution of Natural 
Resources and Nunavut’s Constitutional Status, 43 J. CAN. STUD. 198, 200 
(200); see Yukon Act, S.C. 2002, c.7 (Can.); Nunavut Act, S.C. 1993, c. 28 
(Can.), Northwest Territories Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-27 (Can.). 
13 1987 Constitutional Accord, PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE, http://www.pco-
bcp.gc.ca/aia/index.asp?lang=eng&page=constitution&doc=meech-eng.htm 
(last updated Apr. 26, 2010); see generally ANDREW COHEN, A DEAL UNDONE: 
THE MAKING AND BREAKING OF THE MEECH LAKE ACCORD (1990) (surveying 
the history of the Meech Lake negotiations and the subsequent failure of the 
ratification process). 
14 Tony Penikett, Destiny or Dream? Sharing Resources, Revenues and 
Political Power in Nunavut Devolution, in POLAR LAW TEXTBOOK II, at 199, 
200 (Natalia Loukacheva, ed., 2013). 
15 See id. 
16 Minister of Pub. Works & Gov’t Servs. Can., Yukon Northern Affairs 
Program Devolution Transfer Agreement (2001), https://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1297283624739/1297283711723 (accessed July 10, 2013). 
17 Id. arts. 1.25-1.26. 
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legislation of its own.
18
 The NWT Devolution Agreement-in-
Principle, signed with Canada in 2011,
19
 provides for a similar 
set of territorial powers. 
Yukon and NWT were and are not provinces, not even 
provinces with less than full provincial powers like Alberta and 
Saskatchewan were in 1905. After reaching their respective 
devolution deals with Ottawa, both territories remained 
territories, but now hold province-like jurisdiction over their own 
lands and resources. Only Nunavut is still out in the cold. 
Nunavut is Canada’s youngest territory, created by an Act of 
Parliament in 1999.
20
 It is the result of the largest
21
 Aboriginal 
land claims settlement
22
 in Canadian history, reached between 
                                                 
18 E-mail from Piers McDonald to Tony Penikett, August 18, 2012, on 
file with author. 
19 Northwest Territories Land and Resources Devolution Agreement 
(May 31, 2013), available at http://devolution.gov.nt.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/Final-DevolutionAgreement-May-31.pdf (accessed 
July 10, 2013). 
20 Nunavut Act, S.C. 1993, c. 28 (Can.). 
21 See Michael Mifflin, Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty and Nunavut’s 
Place in the Federation, POLICY OPTIONS, July/August 2008, at 86, 
http://archive.irpp.org/po/archive/jul08/mifflin.pdf.  
22 Twenty-three comprehensive land claim agreements are now in force 
across Canada. See Government of Canada Progress Report (2006-2012), With 
Strong Resolve: Advancing Our Relationship with First Nations Peoples and 
Communities, ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT CANADA 
(2012), available at http://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1327173357543/1327173403786 (last updated Jan. 22, 2012). 
The modern instruments, together with two self-government agreements, cover 
some forty percent of Canada’s total landmass. Id. The treaties transfer title to 
huge tracts of land and re-establish aboriginal governance of those treaty lands. 
Comprehensive Land Claim Agreements (CLCAs), ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS AND 
NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT CANADA, http://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100027668/1100100027669 (last modified Sept. 15, 
2010). Unlike the nineteenth-century treaties that consigned First Nations to 
tiny reserves on marginal land, these northern treaties operate on a larger 
geographic scale and have broader political scope; the Yukon treaty, for 
example, provides 41,000 square kilometres to seven thousand Dene and 
Tlingit, more land than is covered by all the Indian reservations in all of 
southern Canada. See Umbrella Final Agreement Between The Government Of 
Canada, The Council For Yukon Indians and The Government Of The Yukon 
(2003), available at http://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1297278586814/1297278924701 (last updated Feb. 9, 2011). 
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Canada and the Inuit
23
 of the Eastern Arctic in 1993.
24
 The 
Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA)
25
 made the Inuit there 
the largest private landowners in the world, with collective title 
to 350,000 square kilometres.
26
 
That treaty also created the Nunavut territory,
27
 a new 
jurisdiction in which the Inuit constitute more than eighty 
percent of the population.
28
 However, even after the 1993 NLCA 
and the creation of Nunavut in 1999, Ottawa still retains 
legislative jurisdiction over the territory’s lands and resources. 
As energy developments and climate change both affect the 
Arctic environment, uncertainty about the future of Nunavut 
continues to grow. 
As Arctic residents for thousands of years, the Inuit now see 
Nunavut devolution as the third and next step, after treaty 
agreement and territorial status, in their journey towards 
                                                 
23 The Inuit, formerly known as Eskimos, live in four countries: Russia, 
the United States, Greenland, and Canada. See INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL 
(CANADA), http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/index.php?Lang=En&ID=1. In 
Canada, the Inuit achieved land claims settlements in Northern Quebec in 1975, 
the Western Arctic in 1984, Labrador—also known as Nunatsiuvut—in 2004, 
and Nunavik—in Northern Quebec—in 2006. See James Bay and Northern 
Quebec Agreement (Nov. 11, 1975), available at 
http://www.gcc.ca/pdf/LEG000000006.pdf (accessed July 10, 2013); The 
Western Arctic Claim Inuvialuit Final Agreement, available at 
http://www.inuvialuitland.com/resources/Inuvialuit_Final_Agreement.pdf 
(accessed July 10, 2013); Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement, available at 
http://www.exec.gov.nl.ca/exec/igas/land_claims/January212005AgreementCo
mplete.pdf (accessed July 10, 2013); Nunavik Inuit Land Claims Agreement, 
available at 
http://www.nonstatusindian.com/docs/selfgovern/Nunavik_Inuit_LandClaim.p
df (accessed July 10, 2013). 
24 See Mifflin, supra note 21, at 86. 
25 See Agreement Between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and 
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada (May 25, 1993), available at 
http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20071124140800/http://www.
ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/agr/pdf/nunav_e.pdf (accessed June 27, 2013) [hereinafter 
NLCA]. 
26 See Penikett, supra note 14, at 201. 
27 Nunavut was carved out of the eastern Northwest Territories in 1999, 
pursuant to Article 4 of the NLCA. NLCA, supra note 25, art. 4. 
28 Nunavut, Canada’s Third Territory ‘North of 60,’ ABORIGINAL 
AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT CANADA, http://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1303138100962/1303138315347 (last updated Oct. 10, 2012). 
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autonomy within Canada.
29
 Until devolution is achieved, 
Nunavut will remain the only Canadian jurisdiction without 
legislative control of its own resource base—the only place 
where Canadian citizens do not elect a local legislature that 
makes decisions about the land beneath their feet. Devolution 
would close this citizenship gap at last. 
Prime Minister Paul Martin promised on December 14, 2004 
to start devolution negotiations with Nunavut. Based on this 
promise, the Government of Nunavut’s Cabinet approved a 
devolution negotiation mandate for a three-cornered negotiation 
between itself, Canada, and Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated 
(NTI), the Inuit political body that is responsible for 
implementing the NLCA on behalf of its beneficiaries. In a 2007 
letter, the special representative of the federal Minister of Indian 
Affairs and Northern Development recommended that talks 
begin by agreeing on a devolution negotiations protocol,
30
 and 
the Nunavut Lands and Resources Devolution Negotiation 
Protocol was concluded the following year.
31
 The Protocol 
stipulates that the parties will negotiate an Agreement-in-
Principle for the devolution of jurisdiction over lands and 
minerals, and also includes a firm commitment to start second-
stage negotiations for an integrated onshore and seabed oil and 
gas management regime.
32
 
                                                 
29 See Eva Aariak, The Next Step in Nunavut’s Journey, NUNATSIAQ 
NEWS, Nov. 8, 2010, 
http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/98789_the_next_step_in_nunavut
s_journey/.  
30 PAUL MAYER, MAYER REPORT ON NUNAVUT DEVOLUTION (2007), 
available at http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQ-
NTH/STAGING/texte-text/dev_mr_1357230369296_eng.pdf. 
31 Lands and Resources Devolution Negotiation Protocol, available at 
http://www.tunngavik.com/documents/publications/Devolution%20Protocol%2
0Eng%205%20Sept%202008.pdf (last modified Sept. 8, 2008). Initially, 
Ottawa wanted simply to transfer the administration of its Northern Affairs 
Program and federal lands in Nunavut to the territorial government. See 
MAYER, supra note 30, at 40. The Government of Nunavut was more interested 
in jurisdiction over both land and seabed resources in the territory. See Penikett, 
supra note 14, at 202. The protocol eventually sought to combine the 
negotiation of these two objectives. Id. 
32 The Protocol furthers both the territory’s objectives and those of the 
federal government; the territory seeks the devolution of jurisdiction—that is, 
province-like powers—over its lands and waters, while the federal government 
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The Protocol’s promise has, however, gone unfulfilled. In 
the five years since the Protocol was concluded, the federal 
government has engaged in no serious negotiations toward 
sharing jurisdiction or resource revenues; a federal negotiator 
appointed on May 18, 2012 is instructed merely “to engage key 
stakeholders on their views with respect to devolution to identify 
the next steps required to advance negotiations and to examine 
how land and resource management capacity can be improved in 
Nunavut.”33 Canada questions Nunavut’s capacity to manage its 
current responsibilities, much less administer the territory’s lands 
and resources. On January 27, 2011, the Minister of Indian and 
Northern Affairs went so far as to tell reporters that Nunavut and 
its population were “not at the stage of readiness” to assume 
responsibility for managing their lands.
34
 After decades of 
federal control—during which Ottawa neither supported nor 
encouraged the training of any Inuit exploration geologists, 
mining engineers, or chartered accountants—federal officials 
now point to the dearth of Inuit exploration geologists, mining 
engineers, and chartered accountants as a reason not to trust 
                                                                                                 
has been primarily concerned, instead, with building the territorial 
government’s administrative capacity. Id. Nunavut’s position is rooted in 
indigenous history. In summer and winter for thousands of years, the Inuit 
fished and hunted on the lands and waters around their Arctic homelands—and 
also lived on the sea ice. Rick Riewe, Inuit Use of the Sea Ice, 23 ARCTIC & 
ALPINE RESEARCH 3, 3 (1991). As a result, today, all but one of Nunavut’s 
communities are coastal settlements—all of which have a vital interest in ice. 
Id. Nunavut’s first premier, Paul Okalik, insisted repeatedly that devolution 
negotiations must include not only topics such as net economic and fiscal 
benefits and trained staff, but also jurisdiction over Nunavut’s internal waters, 
on which the Inuit historically fished, hunted, and lived. See Jim Bell, Okalik: 
Devolution Must Include Internal Waters, NUNATSIAQ NEWS, Dec. 22, 2006, 
http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/archives/61222/news/nunavut/61222_05.html. 
However, Premier Okalik conceded that, if Ottawa were serious about 
negotiating jurisdiction, the more complicated question of seabed resources or 
“internal waters” could be deferred to a later phase of the negotiations. Id. 
33 Press Release, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 
Minister Duncan Appoints Chief Federal Negotiator for Nunavut Devolution 
(May 18, 2012), available at http://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1337345570394/1337345596592. 
34 Nunavut Premier Wants Devolution Talks, CBC NEWS (Jan. 27, 2011, 
5:40PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/story/2011/01/27/nunavut-
devolution-nwt-eva-aariak.html.  
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Nunavut’s government with the jurisdiction that it seeks.35 This 
is despite Yukon’s experience; in that territory’s devolution deal, 
the territorial government assumed jurisdiction over oil and gas 
developments, then contracted the administration of that 
jurisdiction back to the federal government’s National Energy 
Board.
36
 Jurisdiction formally changed hands, in other words, but 
in a manner that ensured a smooth transition to local control, and 
this policy innovation has given Yukon the time it needs to build 
administrative capacity while also exercising jurisdiction in 
strategically vital fields.
37
 Nunavut's negotiators have suggested 
similar arrangements, as yet to no avail.
38
 
This Article argues that, in the context of Canadian and 
international law, the federal government’s concerns about 
“capacity” should not ultimately be dispositive. The status quo—
the citizenship gap—is undeniably unequal; Canadian citizens 
have the democratic power to choose provincial or territorial 
representatives who make decisions about the management of 
the lands and resources beneath their feet in every jurisdiction—
with one exception. Nunavut’s lesser status within the Canadian 
federal system raises basic questions of equality and rights that 
only devolution can resolve. Non-devolution also complicates 
Canada’s claims to Arctic sovereignty, even as the region’s 
geostrategic significance skyrockets. The rest of this Article lays 
out the argument for devolution from the point of view of 
Canadian and international law. 
 
II. DEVOLUTION AND INDIGENOUS RIGHTS 
 
A. Inuit Self-Government Through the Government of 
Nunavut 
 
Nunavut’s creation in 1999 came after decades of activism 
and negotiation by Inuit leaders. The Inuit Tapirisat of Canada 
(ITC) had been asserting Inuit claims in the Canadian Eastern 
                                                 
35 See MAYER, supra note 30, at 30. 
36 Penikett, supra note 14, at 205. 
37 Id. 
38 MAYER, supra note 30, at 30-31. 
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Arctic since the early 1970s.
39
 In the same period, Inuit and Dene 
leaders across Canada’s North began to speak in the language of 
self-determination. As a group of territorial councilors—as the 
Northwest Territories’ Members of the Legislative Assembly 
(MLAs) were then called—wrote in Nunatsiaq News40 in 1975: 
 
[T]he Inuit, the Dene, Indians and Metis, have the 
right to political self-determination. This is the crux 
of the matter. . . . This claim for equality in political 
self-determination is based firmly on the indisputable 
fact that the Inuit and the Dene are the aboriginals—
the first citizens of the land they claim as their 
homeland. . . . We want to hear the Minister of Indian 
and Northern Affairs . . . say categorically: “We hold 
it as a matter of principle that the Inuit and Dene 
people of the Northwest Territories have the right, 
within Canada's constitution, to political self-
determination within their homelands.”41 
 
In 1977, ITC published Speaking for the First Citizens of the 
Canadian Arctic, which called explicitly for self-government.
42
 
“We want the opportunity to run our own affairs,” the document 
states.
43
 “We want to cooperate with Canada as partners in 
Confederation. We are not opposed to development. We are 
realistic enough to know that some development is inevitable. 
But we want to run our own affairs, and we seek guarantees that 
our land will not be destroyed.”44 Decades before the NLCA was 
concluded and Nunavut was created, decision-making power 
over land was at the heart of Inuit claims. Here, indigenous 
leaders echoed Quebec’s nationalists, who nationalized many of 
                                                 
39 See Jessica Shadian, Remaking Arctic Governance: The Construction 
of an Arctic Inuit Polity, 42 POLAR RECORD 249, 252 (2006).  
40 Nunatsiaq News is a weekly newspaper published in Iqaluit, which 
became Nunavut’s capital when the territory was created in 1999. 
41 Ludy Pudluk et al., Statement: “Political Development in the North,” 
NUNATSIAQ NEWS, Oct. 22, 1975, available at 
http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/archives/april0199/nvt90401_03.html. 
42 INUIT TAPIRISAT OF CANADA, SPEAKING FOR THE FIRST CITIZENS OF THE 
CANADIAN ARCTIC (1977). 
43 Id. at 4. 
44 Id. at 7. 
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that province’s hydroelectric resources during the “Quiet 
Revolution” of the 1960s.45 Premier Jean Lesage made that 
pledge the centerpiece of his 1962 re-election campaign, during 
which his party’s slogan was “maîtres chez nous,” masters of our 
own house.
46
 As the five territorial councilors wrote in 
Nunatsiaq News, fifteen years later, theirs was “essentially the 
same claim French-speaking Canadians make for themselves in 
Quebec.”47 The Inuit intended to become maîtres chez nous.48 
Yet, when the NLCA and the accompanying Nunavut 
Political Accord
49
 were finally concluded, the self-government 
and self-determination rhetoric of 1970s Inuit political activism 
was excluded.
50
 The Accord’s preamble does begin with a simple 
statement of purpose that anchors Nunavut in the indigenous 
claims of decades past: “[T]he creation of a new Nunavut 
Territory with its own government is a fundamental objective of 
the Inuit of Nunavut,” it declares.51 Still, the federal government 
has left little room for interpretation. As Jane Stewart, then the 
Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, told the 
House of Commons in 1998: 
 
[W]e are not talking about self-government for the 
Inuit people. We are talking about building a public 
government that will represent all who live in the 
eastern Arctic, in the territory of Nunavut. With this 
public government, we will have a structure that 
better represents the Inuit people who make up 85% 
of the population but which, in addition, is 
                                                 
45 See John Parisella, Robert Bourassa: Vision and Resilience, POL’Y 
OPTIONS, June/July 2012, at 1. 
46 See David Gagnon, Un slogan, et tout devient possible, 153 QUÉBEC 
FRANÇAIS 58, 58 (2009). 
47 Pudluk et al., supra note 41. 
48 Grammatically, this should be “maîtres chez eux,” but you take our 
point. 
49 Nunavut Political Accord, Oct. 30, 1992, available at 
http://www.tunngavik.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/nunavut-political-
accord-1992.pdf [hereinafter NPA]. 
50 Alisa Henderson, Self-Government in Nunavut, in ABORIGINAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT IN CANADA: CURRENT TRENDS AND ISSUES 230 (Yale D. 
Belanger, ed., 2008). 
51 NPA, supra note 49, pmbl. 
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representative of those other Canadians who live in 
the territory.
52
 
 
In negotiating the NLCA, the Inuit opted for a so-called 
public form of government,
53
 rather than for the kind of 
Aboriginal self-government that the Nisga’a of northern British 
Columbia achieved in their treaty with Canada and British 
Columbia six years later, in 1999.
54
 As a consequence, the 
Government of Nunavut is not constituted as an Aboriginal 
government, but rather as a territorial government, elected by all 
Canadian citizens who reside in Nunavut, be they Inuit or not.
55
 
This distinction is crucial, but it is also where form and 
substance begin to diverge. Nunavut’s territorial government has 
widely been characterized—including by the federal 
government
56—as “de facto” self-government.57 The 
overwhelming majority of Nunavummiut are Inuit,
58
 and the 
Nunavut Act,
59
 by which Parliament created the territory, 
explicitly contemplates its indigenous character.
60
 And Nunavut 
                                                 
52 Hon. Jane Stewart, Minister of Indian Affairs and N. Dev., Remarks to 
the House of Commons, 36th Parl., 1st Sess., (Apr. 20, 1998).  
53 NATALIA LOUKACHEVA, THE ARCTIC PROMISE: LEGAL AND POLITICAL 
AUTONOMY OF GREENLAND AND NUNAVUT 49 (2007). 
54 Nisga’a Final Agreement, Apr. 27, 1999, available at 
http://www.nnkn.ca/files/u28/nis-eng.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2013). 
55 KIM VAN DAM, A PLACE CALLED NUNAVUT: MULTIPLE IDENTITIES FOR 
A NEW REGION 69 (2008). 
56 See André Légaré, An Assessment of Recent Political Development in 
Nunavut: The Challenges and Dilemmas of Inuit Self-Government, 18 CAN. J. 
NATIVE STUD. 271, 289 (1996). 
57 LOUKACHEVA, supra note 53, at 49-50; see also Henderson, supra note 
50, at 232. 
58 See Nunavut Population Estimates by Inuit and Non-Inuit, Region and 
Community, 2006 to 2012, Table in Population Estimates, NUNAVUT BUREAU 
OF STATISTICS (MAR. 18, 2013), 
http://www.stats.gov.nu.ca/en/Population%20estimate.aspx.  
59 Nunavut Act, S.C. 1998, c. 28 (Can.). 
60 See, e.g., Nunavut Act, S.C. 1998, c. 28, § 23(1)(n) (conferring on the 
Nunavut legislature the jurisdiction over “the preservation, use and promotion 
of the Inuktitut language.”). Id. at § 24. “The Legislature may not make laws 
under section 23 that restrict or prohibit Indians or Inuit from hunting, on 
unoccupied Crown lands, for food game other than game declared by order of 
the Governor in Council to be game in danger of becoming extinct.” Id. at § 25. 
“[T]he Legislature may make laws under any other provision of this Act for the 
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owes its very existence to the NLCA,
61
 which was the basis 
for—and enacted alongside62—the Nunavut Act, and which is an 
agreement between Canada’s Inuit people and the Crown. In the 
words of Nunavut Premier Eva Aariak: 
 
When pursuing greater control over our affairs, Inuit 
in what is now Nunavut opted for a public 
government. All citizens in the territory—regardless 
of ethnicity—participate in elections. This does not 
prevent us from seeking a government that embodies 
the knowledge and values of our Inuit majority. 
Indeed, the Government of Nunavut has adopted . . . 
Inuit principles that are meant to inform its operations 
and its relations with the public.
63
 
 
The Inuit character of—and imprint on—the territory’s 
organic documents is undeniable. To mention just a few 
examples: the NLCA guarantees full Inuit participation in public 
hearings of the Nunavut Wildlife Management Board.
64
 It 
protects Inuit rights to harvest.
65
 It provides for government 
                                                                                                 
purpose of implementing the land claims agreement entered into by Her 
Majesty in right of Canada and the Inuit on May 25, 1993 . . . .” Id. at § 51(1). 
“The Governor in Council may make regulations for the protection, care and 
preservation of sites, works, objects and specimens in Nunavut of 
palaeontological, archaeological, ethnological or historical importance.” Id. at § 
5. 
61 NLCA supra note 25.  
62 Nunavut Land Claims Agreement Act, S.C. 1993, c. 29 (Can.), 
available at http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/N-28.7.pdf. 
63 Eva Aariak, Premier of Nunavut, Speech at the Seventh Annual 
Symons Lecture on the State of the Confederation (Nov. 3, 2009), available at 
http://www.premier.gov.nu.ca/apps/News/dspNews.aspx?id=41 ( emphasis in 
original). 
64 NLCA, supra note 25, art. 5.2.28. “Any representative or agent of the 
Government of Canada or Territorial Government, any Inuk . . . shall be 
accorded the status of full party at a public hearing . . . .” Id. 
65 Id. art. 5.6.1.  “Where a total allowable harvest for a stock or 
population of wildlife has not been established by the [Nunavut Wildlife 
Management Board] . . . , an Inuk shall have the right to harvest that stock or 
population in the Nunavut Settlement Area up to the full level of his or her 
economic, social, and cultural needs . . . .” Id. “[T]he following persons . . . 
may harvest furbearers in the Nunavut Settlement Area, namely: (a) an Inuk . . . 
.” Id. art. 5.6.13. “[A] General Hunting Licence held by a person who is not an 
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communications in Inuktitut,
66
 and the official recognition of 
Inuit history.
67
 It guarantees Inuit employment in government,
68
 
and it governs the process by which Inuit membership is defined 
and administered.
69
 Most notably, the NLCA declares itself to be 
“a land claims agreement within the meaning of Section 35 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982.”70 As Member of Parliament (MP) 
Jack Anawak, later one of Nunavut’s first territorial legislators, 
told the federal House of Commons in 1996: “[T]here are around 
20,000 people in Nunavut. . . . [T]hose 20,000 people can record 
their history back thousands of years. They have occupied that 
land for at least 4,000 years.”71 Anawak also informed the 
House—in Inuktitut, no less—that, “[n]o piece of legislation can 
take away the Inuit way of life. . . . That way of life is protected 
in the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement and in the Constitution 
of Canada.”72 Non-Inuit MPs have been even more explicit: “We 
                                                                                                 
Inuk is deemed to be a personal licence only, and is neither transferable nor 
heritable.” Id. art. 5.6.15. “Harvesting by a person other than an Inuk shall be 
subject to this Article and all laws of general application.” (emphasis added). 
Id. art. 5.6.37. “No by-law . . . shall unreasonably prevent the individual Inuk 
from harvesting for the purpose of meeting the consumption needs of himself 
or herself and his or her dependents.” Id. art. 5.7.11. “[A]n Inuk with proper 
identification may harvest up to his or her adjusted basic needs level without 
any form of licence or permit and without imposition of any form of tax or 
fee.” Id. art. 5.7.26. “An Inuk shall have the right to remove up to 50 cubic 
yards per year of carving stone from Crown lands without a permit . . . .” Id. 
art. 19.9.4. 
66 Id. arts. 8.4.16, 10.6.1(g), 11.4.15, 12.2.26, 13.3.11-12, 21.8.8, 
23.4.2(d)(ii), 35.6.4, 36.2.12. 
67 Id. art 8.4.18. 
68 Id. art 23.4.1-.4. 
69 Id. art. 35. 
70 Id. art 2.2.1. Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 declares that, 
“[t]he existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada 
are hereby recognized and affirmed.” The Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B 
to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11; see generally THOMAS ISAAC, 
ABORIGINAL LAW: COMMENTARY & ANALYSIS 19-24 (2012) (describing Section 
35 and its application). 
71 Remarks by Jack Anawak, MP for Nunatsiaq, to the House of 
Commons, 35th Parl., 2nd Sess., Oct. 29, 1996, 92 DEBATES 5868, available at 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mod
e=1&Parl=35&Ses=2&DocId=2332630#5868. 
72 Remarks by Jack Anawak, MP for Nunatsiaq, to the House of 
Commons, 35th Parl., 1st Sess., June 13, 1995, 217 DEBATES 13700, available 
at 
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have just established Nunavut within Canada, an Inuit territory,” 
MP John Finlay declared in 2000.
73
 In the spring of 2013, 
Western Arctic MP Denis Bevington described Nunavut 
Tunngavik Inc., the entity that represents the NLCA’s Inuit 
beneficiaries, as “the land claims group that worked so hard to 
establish its homeland in Nunavut.”74 When Terry Audla, the 
new president of Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, Canada’s national Inuit 
organization, told a House of Commons committee in October 
2012 that Nunavut was “the Inuit homeland in Canada,”75 surely 
no one batted an eye. As Inuit leader John Amagoalik announced 
after the NLCA’s conclusion: “No other land claim has involved 
creating a new territory with our own government. It is a victory. 
We’ve achieved what other aboriginal people can only dream 
about.”76 
The operation of Nunavut’s territorial government itself 
defies a crisp distinction between indigenous and non-
indigenous. Though it is organized in the Westminster tradition, 
                                                                                                 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mod
e=1&Parl=35&Ses=1&DocId=2332474#13700. 
73 Remarks by John Finlay, MP for Oxford, to the House of Commons, 
36th Parl., 2nd Sess., Mar. 13, 2000, 63 DEBATES 1645, available at 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mod
e=1&Parl=36&Ses=2&DocId=2332187#LINK249. 
74 Remarks by Dennis Bevington, MP for Western Arctic, to the House of 
Commons, 41st Parl., 1st Sess., Mar. 4, 2013, 218 DEBATES 1225, available at 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mod
e=1&Parl=41&Ses=1&DocId=6017925#Int-7913404. 
75 Statement by Terry Audla, President, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, to the 
House of Commons Finance Committee, 41st Parl., 1st Sess., Oct. 29, 2012, 84 
EVIDENCE 1720, available at 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=5797712&L
anguage=E&Mode=1&Parl=41&Ses=1#Int-7747698. 
76 Alexandra Kersey, The Nunavut Agreement: A Model for Preserving 
Indigenous Rights, 11 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 429, 429 (1994) (quoting  Trish 
Crawford, The Year of the Indian, TORONTO STAR, Apr. 18, 1993, at B1); see 
also Jack Hicks & Graham White, Nunavut: Inuit Self-Determination Through 
a Land Claim and Public Government?, in NUNAVUT: INUIT REGAIN CONTROL 
OF THEIR LANDS AND THEIR LIVES 30 (Jens Dahl et al., eds., 2000) (“Roughly 
85 per cent of Nunavut’s population are Inuit, so that although it has a ‘public 
government’—in which all residents, Inuit and non-Inuit, can participate—
Nunavut is primarily about Inuit needs and Inuit approaches to governance. . . . 
Nunavut differs fundamentally from other Canadian provinces and 
territories.”). 
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it also strives to be characteristically Inuit in its operation. There 
are no political parties.
77
 The legislature operates by consensus.
78
 
Inuit legal procedures figure into the functioning of the territorial 
executive.
79
 The legislative chamber itself, in Iqaluit, is 
festooned with Inuit signs and symbols.
80
 Though, pursuant to 
the Nunavut Act and Section 32 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms,
81
 the Charter applies to Nunavut, the 
territory’s Human Rights Act,82 adopted in 2003, begins with an 
endorsement of Inuit culture and values.
83
 Even the Nunavut 
Court of Justice—a conspicuously colonial institution, staffed 
entirely by non-Inuit judges
84—has adopted the practice of 
having its clerks (and some judges) wear sealskin vests and 
robes. The Government of Nunavut is engaged in a constant 
effort better to indigenize its own institutions, from preferential 
public service hiring policies, to legislation to protect Inuit 
language, to initiatives to integrate Inuit Qaujimjatuqangit—
traditional knowledge, thinking, and practice—into the 
Government’s relationship with Nunavummiut.85 Membership in 
the polity is also harder to earn in Nunavut than anywhere else in 
Canada; unlike other Canadian jurisdictions, where six months’ 
residency is sufficient to vest a citizen with full rights of political 
                                                 
77 JOHN BORROWS, CANADA’S INDIGENOUS CONSTITUTION 103 (2010). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 See LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF NUNAVUT, http://www.assembly.nu.ca./ 
(last visited Aug. 24, 2013).   
81 The Charter, which was enacted as Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
is Canada’s bill of rights. See The Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, ss. 1-34. 
82 Human Rights Act, S.Nu. 2003, c. 12. 
83 Id. at pmbl.; see also Bill Rafoss, First Nations and the Charter of 
Rights, in MOVING TOWARD JUSTICE: LEGAL TRADITIONS AND ABORIGINAL 
JUSTICE 198, 203 (John D. Whyte ed., 2008) (discussing the same). 
84 See Meet the Judges, NUNAVUT COURT OF JUSTICE (Feb. 21, 2013), 
http://www.nucj.ca/judges.htm.  
85 Henderson, supra note 50, at 237; see also BORROWS, supra note 77, at 
103 (“Today, the Nunavut territorial government is one of the most important 
institutions implementing Inuit legal traditions in Canada. The government has 
taken great guidance from Inuit Qaujimjatuqangit to structure its legislative and 
administrative agenda and actions.”). 
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membership, Nunavut requires a full year of residency before 
extending the franchise.
86
 
It is impossible, in other words, to understand Nunavut’s 
government without reference to Inuit self-government. The 
logic of the NLCA—and of Nunavut’s creation—can therefore 
be understood to lead inexorably towards devolution. Kirk 
Cameron and Alastair Campbell state the argument succinctly: 
 
[T]he vision underlying the land claim . . . can only be 
fully realized following the transfer of jurisdiction for 
land and resource administration and control to the 
territory. Without devolution, self-sufficiency and the 
pride that comes with that cannot be pursued. Without 
devolution, the pace and direction of development 
remains significantly tied to a distant federal 
administration operating on the basis of national 
considerations.
87
 
 
Yet, perhaps the most convincing evidence to support this 
proposition is contained within the NLCA itself. In the event that 
the Inuit of Nunavut ever cease to comprise a majority of the 
territory’s inhabitants, they retain the right to seek formal 
Aboriginal self-government under Section 35 of the Constitution 
Act, 1982.
88
 Until they do so, Nunavut’s government—though 
formally “public” and not “ethnic”—will continue to serve the 
purpose of Inuit self-government. 
Nunavut’s territorial government is the living embodiment of 
the Inuit right to self-government under Canadian and 
international law. This right survives the NLCA; though the 
NLCA states that the Inuit have “cede[d], release[d], and 
surrender[ed] all their aboriginal claims, rights, title and 
interests, if any, in and to lands and waters anywhere within 
Canada and adjacent offshore areas within the sovereignty or 
jurisdiction of Canada,”89 this release does not apply to self-
government rights, since those rights attach to the Inuit 
                                                 
86 J.R. MILLER, LETHAL LEGACY: CURRENT NATIVE CONTROVERSIES IN 
CANADA 272 (2004). 
87 Cameron & Campbell, supra note 12, at 211. 
88 See LOUKACHEVA, supra note 53, at 49. 
89 NLCA, supra note 25, art. 2.7.1(a). 
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themselves, not to the lands covered by the NLCA.
90
 They are 
not relinquished thereunder.
91
 Ottawa has implicitly, if 
indirectly, conceded as much; two years after the NLCA was 
finalized, the federal government adopted its 1995 “Inherent 
Right Policy”:  
 
The Government of Canada recognizes the inherent 
right of self-government as an existing Aboriginal 
right under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. . 
. . Recognition of the inherent right is based on the 
view that the Aboriginal peoples of Canada have the 
right to govern themselves in relation to matters that 
are internal to their communities, integral to their 
unique cultures, identities, traditions, languages and 
institutions, and with respect to their special 
relationship to their land and their resources.
92
 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada has also recognized that, 
though the Crown is ultimately sovereign, Aboriginal peoples 
enjoy a limited right to self-government under Canada’s 
Constitution.
93
 This right survives notwithstanding the “cede, 
release, and surrender” language in the NLCA, since that waiver 
applies only to “claims, rights, title and interests . . . in and to 
lands and waters.”94 Under Canadian law, Aboriginal rights—
including the right to self-government—are not coterminous 
with Aboriginal title.
95
 The Supreme Court of Canada has held, 
                                                 
90 See Légaré, supra note 56, at 289. 
91 Id. 
92 The Government of Canada’s Approach to Implementation of the 
Inherent Right and the Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-Government, 
ABORIGINAL AFF. & N. DEV. CAN., https://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100031843/1100100031844 (last modified Sept. 15, 
2010). 
93 See generally R. v. Pamajewon, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821 (Can.). 
94 NLCA, supra note 25, art. 2.7.1(a) (emphasis added). 
95 As the Supreme Court of Canada held in R. v. Van der Peet, “in order 
to be an aboriginal right an activity must be an element of a practice, custom or 
tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the aboriginal group claiming the 
right.” R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, 509 (Can.). Aboriginal title, by 
contrast, was determined in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia to be “a species 
of aboriginal right recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) [that] is distinct from 
other aboriginal rights because it arises where the connection of a group with a 
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for example, that though provinces may hold title in and to “[a]ll 
[l]ands, [m]ines, [m]inerals, and [r]oyalties,”96 that title is 
nonetheless subject to Aboriginal rights thereon.
97
 
This is distinct from the approach taken in U.S. law, which 
does not distinguish Aboriginal rights and title as clearly as 
Canadian law does. In the United States, indigenous peoples may 
claim precious few indigenous rights where they do not hold 
title.
98
 Though the U.S. Supreme Court, in its 1823 decision in 
Johnson v. M’Intosh,99 held that title granted by colonial powers 
is nonetheless subject to an “Indian right of occupancy,”100 
which is “as sacred as the fee-simple of the whites,”101 the Court 
has applied this rule narrowly, while recognizing plenary federal 
power over Indians.
102
 Today, in the United States, tribal 
autonomy is limited to a “right of occupancy,” which “may be 
terminated . . . by the sovereign itself without any legally 
enforceable obligation to compensate the Indians.”103 In the 
1970s and 1980s, even as the political branches were endorsing 
legislation that embraced broader claims to Indian self-
determination,
104
 the U.S. Supreme Court held firm that tribal 
                                                                                                 
piece of land was of a central significance to their distinctive culture.” 
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3. S.C.R. 1010, para. 137 (Can.). 
96 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 109 (U.K.). 
97 Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, para. 175. 
98 See Ralph W. Johnson, Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of Canadian and 
United States Policy Toward Indians, 66 WASH. L. REV. 643, 679, 713 (1991). 
99 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
100 Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574 (“While the different nations of 
Europe respected the right of the natives, as occupants, they asserted the 
ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a 
consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in 
possession of the natives. These grants have been understood by all, to convey 
a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy.”). 
101 Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835). 
102 Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977); 
Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937). 
103 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955). 
104 See, e.g., 166 Cong. Rec. 23, 131 (1970) (statement of President 
Nixon) (endorsing Indian self-determination in order “to strengthen the 
Indian’s sense of autonomy”); The Indian Self-Determination and Educational 
Assistance Act of 1975, Pub L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified at 25 
U.S.C. §§ 450-450n, 455-458e) (declaring a congressional commitment to “the 
establishment of a meaningful Indian self-determination policy which will 
permit an orderly transition . . . to effective and meaningful participation by the 
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autonomy could only ever exist “at the sufferance of Congress 
and is subject to complete defeasance,”105 since Congress 
maintained “paramount power over the property of the 
Indians,”106 under the Commerce Clause107 and the federal 
treaty-making power.
108
 
Early Canadian law initially viewed this Indian right of 
occupancy in even more circumscribed terms. In St. Catherine’s 
Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen,
109
 the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council—then Canada’s final court of 
appeal—determined that the Indian right of occupancy was 
merely “personal and usufructuary,” and “dependent upon the 
good will of the sovereign.”110 Any such right was, in any case, 
traceable to the (British) Royal Proclamation of 1763—all 
indigenous rights were held to have a colonial source.
111
 
St. Catherine’s is no longer good law; in 1972, in Calder v. 
British Columbia (Attorney General),
112
 the Supreme Court of 
Canada explicitly rejected the Privy Council’s reasoning. Six of 
seven justices found that Aboriginal title existed at common law 
and that it was not a “personal or usufructuary right,” though it 
was nonetheless “dependent on the goodwill of the 
                                                                                                 
Indian people in the planning, conduct, and administration of those programs 
and services”); The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 
92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-
29(e)(1988)) (ratifying land claims agreements between the U.S. Congress and 
Alaska Native peoples); see generally Jean M. Silveri, Note, Comparative 
Analysis of the History of United States and Canadian Federal Policies 
Regarding Native Self-Government, 16 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 618, 636-
37 (discussing President Nixon’s message to Congress and the Indian Self-
Determination and Educational Assistance Act of 1975, and corresponding 
developments in U.S. case law); Martha Hirschfield, Note, The Alaska Native 
Claims Settlement Act: Tribal Sovereignty and the Corporate Form, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1331 (1992) (discussing the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act). 
105 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). 
106 United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 408 (1980). 
107 U.S. CONST. art. I § 8. 
108 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“The President shall have Power, by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties . . . .”). 
109 [1888], 14 A.C. 46, 46 (P.C.). 
110 Id. at 54. 
111 Id. at 54-55. 
112 [1973] S.C.R. 313. 
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Sovereign.”113 A decade later, in Guerin v. The Queen,114 the 
Court removed the Royal Proclamation altogether as a source of 
Aboriginal rights: “Their interest in their lands is a pre-existing 
legal right not created by the Royal Proclamation . . . or by any 
other executive order or legislative provision,” the Court held.115 
Canadian courts have since acknowledged that indigenous 
nations were sovereign for the purpose of entering into treaties 
with the British Crown,
116
 and that Aboriginal sovereignty 
continued after the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty.117  
It is devilishly difficult, under Canadian law, for any 
indigenous group to prove Aboriginal title to a particular tract of 
land.
118
 Yet the inherent right to self-government, recognized by 
the federal government in 1995,
119
 is not territory-specific; 
unlike in the United States, Canadian indigenous peoples have a 
right to self-government that originates not in land but in 
                                                 
113 [1888] 14 A.C. at 54 (P.C.). 
114 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 (Can.). 
115 Id. at 379. 
116 R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025 (Can.). 
117 Campbell v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2000 CanLII 1123 
(Can. B.C. S.C.). Today, though Aboriginal title and rights may be infringed or 
extinguished by the federal crown, such “infringements [must] satisfy the test 
of justification.” Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 at paras. 160, 173. 
118 See, e.g., Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, para. 7 (Can.) (“The stakes are huge. . . . The Haida’s 
claim to title to Haida Gwaii is strong, as found by the chambers judge. But it is 
also complex and will take many years to prove. In the meantime, the Haida 
argue, their heritage will be irretrievably despoiled.”); William v. British 
Columbia, 2012 CarswellBC 1860, para. 161 (“[T]he stakes in Aboriginal title 
claims have been high—cases such as Calder, Delgamuukw, and Marshall; 
Bernard involved vast areas of land. The resolution of such claims can be 
critical to the future of both the First Nation involved and the broader Canadian 
population.”). 
119 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court of 
Canada has never explicitly recognized such an inherent right to self-
government. See Bradford W. Morse, Regaining Recognition of the Inherent 
Right of Aboriginal Governance, in ABORIGINAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN 
CANADA: CURRENT TRENDS AND ISSUES 39, 62 (Yale D. Belanger, ed., 2008). 
Patrick Macklem has suggested, however, that the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
decisions in Delgamuukw and the earlier case of R. v. Pamajewon, [1996] 2 
S.C.R. 821 (Can.), read together, “suggest an inherent Aboriginal right of self-
government—specifically, a right to make laws . . . in relation to the use of 
reserve lands and lands subject to Aboriginal title.” PATRICK MACKLEM, 
INDIGENOUS DIFFERENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA 174 (2001). 
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identity—it has its origins before contact, and it attaches to 
indigenous peoples themselves.
120
 For the Inuit, the implication 
of this body of law should be that their right to self-government 
is not diminished by the fact that they do not hold title over the 
entirety of Nunavut’s vast geography. Recall, after all, that the 
NLCA guarantees the Inuit the option of later invoking their 
right to self-government if ever they lose their majority in 
Nunavut.
121
 So, unless and until that happens, there are two ways 
to understand the present status of Inuit self-government rights in 
the territory: either they have not yet been vindicated, or else 
they can be exercised through the governance provisions of the 
NLCA, including through the territorial government. The former 
interpretation makes little sense; it makes a mockery of Inuit 
leaders’ understanding of Nunavut as “the Inuit homeland in 
Canada.”122 We are left, then, with a simple conclusion: the 
Government of Nunavut can reasonably be understood as a “de 
facto” form of Inuit self-government.123 The demographic reality 
of the Eastern Arctic can be read expressly into the intentions of 
the Inuit drafters of the NLCA; their choice of a public 
government model can be interpreted as a direct consequence of 
the population’s overwhelming indigeneity—a more explicit 
Nisga’a-like arrangement (which certainly would have been 
more difficult to negotiate) was not necessary to secure the 
Inuit’s immediate objectives.124 Instead, they achieved self-
                                                 
120 See DAN RUSSELL, A PEOPLE’S DREAM: ABORIGINAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT IN CANADA 46 (2000) (“[A] land base is simply not pertinent to 
many matters over which Aboriginal jurisdiction is sought.”). 
121 See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text. 
122 See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. 
123 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
124 As noted above, the Nisga’a treaty was concluded six years after the 
NLCA was finalized. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. It recognizes 
the right of the Nisga’a to self-government within the ambit of Section 35 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982, and, as part and parcel of the same, gives the 
Nisga’a government the authority to manage lands and resources within the its 
jurisdiction. See Fact Sheet: The Nisga’a Treaty, ABORIGINAL AFF. & N. DEV. 
CAN., http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100016428/1100100016429 (last 
modified Sept. 15, 2010). When the Inuit negotiated the NLCA, this self-
government precedent did not yet exist, but the public government model 
offered attractive advantages over a simple land claim; in particular, it allows 
the Inuit, through their majority in Nunavut, to exercise broad powers over 
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government in function, if not explicitly in form.
125
 As J.R. 
Miller has observed: 
 
Although Nunavut has a “public government,” that is 
a territorial government open to all long-term 
residents of the territory, the heavy numerical 
domination of Inuit effectively makes it an Inuit state. 
In the Western Arctic, where relatively significant 
numbers of Dene and Metis exist alongside the Inuit, 
the challenge is obviously greater, if only because a 
“public government” there will not secure self-
government for any single Aboriginal group. The 
same is true of northern Quebec and northern 
Labrador.
126
 
 
In Nunavut, unlike in other parts of the country, the end was 
achieved without the means. The Inuit now seek to practice their 
right to self-government through their territorial government. 
Devolution is the vital next step that will enable them to do so. 
 
 B. Inuit Self-Government Through Devolution 
 
The previous section established that the Inuit’s right to self-
government exists in Canadian law, that its existence does not 
require recognition of exclusively Inuit title over any particular 
geographic area (as would be the case under U.S. law), and that 
it can effectively be exercised through the governance provisions 
of the NLCA, including through the public government of the 
territory. This section argues that, as a consequence, the 
devolution of jurisdiction over lands and resources from the 
                                                                                                 
culture, education, health, and other areas of social and economic policy. 
Légaré, supra note 56, at 279. 
125 See generally Cameron & Campbell, supra note 12, at 209 (“The fact 
that it is a product of Article 4 of the NLCA is a powerful statement regarding 
the important role the public territorial government is intended to play in 
achieving the goals of Inuit.”); Laureen Nowlan-Card, Public Government and 
Regulatory Participation in Nunavut: Effective Self-Government for the Inuit, 5 
DALHOUSIE J. LEGAL STUD. 31, 36 (1996) (explaining the Inuit’s understanding 
of Article 4 of the NLCA as the effective self-government provision of the land 
claim). 
126 MILLER, supra note 86, at 100. 
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federal Parliament to the territorial legislature is the most 
obvious means of vindicating the Inuit right to self-government, 
under Canadian and international law. 
As long as jurisdiction over Nunavut’s lands and resources is 
not devolved to the territorial government, it will remain with the 
federal Parliament, vested in the federal Cabinet. British 
Columbia—with thirty-six Members of Parliament (MPs)—will 
continue to have thirty-six times more jurisdictional clout over 
Nunavut’s lands and resources than Nunavut—with one MP—
does.
127
 And, should Nunavut ever again lack a seat at the 
Cabinet table—as it has done every year other than the last 
five—it would be cut entirely out of the locus of federal 
decision-making; not one single Nunavummiut would be in the 
room when the Cabinet decisions about Nunavut’s lands and 
resources were made. 
Under the NLCA, resource management decisions are 
governed by the work of three co-management boards: the 
Nunavut Wildlife Management Board (NWMB),
128
 the Nunavut 
Impact Review Board (NIRB),
129
 and the Nunavut Water Board 
(NWB).
130
 The co-management boards are a poor proxy for 
jurisdiction, however, since every salient decision—from the 
appointment of board members to the acceptance or rejection of 
the board’s recommendations—ultimately falls to the federal 
Minister responsible, not to the Government of Nunavut.
131
 The 
Inuit of Nunavut, through their territorial legislature, participate 
in every part of the decision-making process—except the 
decision itself.  
Devolution would consequently fill a crucial void in the 
exercise of Inuit self-government in Nunavut. A recent example 
illustrates this point. In the summer of 1962, a Canadian 
                                                 
127 See Guide to the Canadian House of Commons, PARLIAMENT OF 
CANADA, http://www.parl.gc.ca/About/Parliament/GuideToHoC/index-e.htm 
(last updated Dec. 2011). 
128 See NLCA, supra note 25, art. 5.2. 
129 Id. art. 12.2. 
130 Id. art. 13.2. 
131 See, e.g., Helle Høgh, Bowhead Whale Hunting in Nunavut: A Symbol 
of Self-Government, in NUNAVUT: INUIT REGAIN CONTROL OF THEIR LANDS AND 
THEIR LIVES 196, 196-97 (Jens Dahl et al. eds., 2000) (making this point about 
the NWMB). 
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prospector named Murray Watts found iron ore deposits south of 
Pond Inlet, a community on the northern tip of Baffin Island, in 
what is now Nunavut.
132
 The samples he took were impossibly 
pure, with iron content as high as seventy percent.
133
 Five 
decades later, Watts’s claim—now owned by a Toronto outfit 
called Baffinland Iron Mines Corporation—was set to be the 
subject of a $4.1-billion mining development project, among the 
most ambitious ever attempted anywhere in the circumpolar 
world.
134
 Baffinland submitted its Mary River proposal to the 
NIRB, NWB, and the Nunavut Planning Commission
135
 in 2008, 
and its final NIRB hearings took place in the summer of 2012.
136
 
Representatives from the Nunavut communities that would be 
most affected by the project made submissions about its impact 
on everything from small mammals
137
 to domestic violence.
138
 
The NIRB recommended the proposal in September 2012, 
subject to 184 terms and conditions, and sent its report to the 
federal Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern 
                                                 
132 Paul Waldie, A Railway to Arctic Riches: Economic Boom, 
Environmental Threat?, GLOBE & MAIL (May 14, 2011), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/energy-
and-resources/a-railway-to-arctic-riches-economic-boom-environmental-
threat/article4259449/. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 See NLCA, supra note 25, art. 11; see also Nunavut Planning 
Commission, NUNAVUT PLANNING COMMISSION, http://www.nunavut.ca (“The 
Nunavut Planning Commission (NPC) is responsible for the development, 
implementation and monitoring of land use plans that guide and direct resource 
use and development in the Nunavut Settlement Area.”). 
136 See Samantha Dawson, Mary River Project Good for Nunavut and 
Inuit, Baffinland Boss Says, NUNATSIAQ NEWS (July 16, 2012), 
http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674mary_river_project_good_f
or_nunavut_and_inuit_baffinland_boss_says/. In the interests of full disclosure, 
it should be noted that Adam Goldenberg served briefly as a member of the 
Nunavut Department of Justice delegation to these Baffinland NIRB hearings. 
137 See David Murphy, Community Reps: Will Mary River Damage Small 
Mammals?, NUNATSIAQ NEWS (July 20, 2012), 
http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674community_reps_will_mar
y_river_damage_small_mammals/.  
138 See Samantha Dawson, Mary River Project Would Inflict Big Strains 
on Iqaluit: Mayor, NUNATSIAQ NEWS (July 23, 2012), 
http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674mary_river_project_would_
inflict_big_strains_on_iqaluit_mayor/.  
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Development for final approval.
139
 The federal government 
approved the project in early December of the same year.
140
 
Throughout the process, the Government of Nunavut’s role 
was, at most, peripheral. The statement issued by the territory’s 
premier, after the NIRB approved the project, is telling: “The 
[Government of Nunavut] will be diligent in completing a 
review of the recommendations made by NIRB to the 
Government of Canada and will be able to comment in more 
detail once that is complete,” said Premier Eva Aariak.141 “We 
look forward to a timely decision from the Federal Minister of 
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada.”142 After 
a four-year review process for a project whose cost will run to $4 
billion
143—the largest infrastructure ever proposed in Canada’s 
North
144—with potentially huge revenue implications for 
governments and NLCA beneficiaries, the territorial 
                                                 
139 Nuanvut Board Says Yes to Mary River, with Conditions, NUNATSIAQ 
NEWS (Sept. 24, 2012), 
http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674nunavut_board_says_yes_t
o_mary_river_with_conditions/. 
140 Duncan Says Yes to Nunavut’s Mary River Iron Mine, NUNATSIAQ 
NEWS (Dec. 3, 2012), 
http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674duncan_says_yes_to_nunav
uts_mary_river_iron_mine/. 
141 Office of the Premier, Government of Nunavut, GN Response to 
NIRB’s Baffinland Recommendations (Sept. 14, 2012), available at 
http://www.gov.nu.ca/news/2012/september/sep14.pdf.  
142 Id. 
143 Multibillion-Dollar Iron Mine Approved for Baffin Island, CBC NEWS 
(Sept. 15, 2012), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/story/2012/09/15/north-
baffinland-mine-decision.html. The project has since been scaled back to an 
initial $740-billion build phase, to reflect volatility in global commodities 
markets. See Pav Jordan, Baffinland Sees Silver Lining in Scaling Back Mary 
River Project, GLOBE & MAIL (Jan. 25, 2013), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/energy-
andresources/baffinland-sees-silver-lining-in-scaling-back-mary-river-
project/article7849338/. This “early revenue” modification is now undergoing a 
fresh NIRB review, with an expedited public consultation process to be 
completed during2013. See Jane George, Baffinland Lets NIRB Look at Plan 
for Mary River Lite, NUNATSIAQ NEWS (June 17, 2013), 
http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674baffinland_lets_nirb_look_
at_plan_for_mary_river_lite/.  
144 Nunavut Braces for Massive Mary River Mine, CBC NEWS (Sept. 13, 
2012), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/story/2012/09/13/north-
baffinland-iron-mine-0913.html.  
50 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 22.1 
 
 
government’s official role in the project’s final approval was 
essentially a polite wave as the decision drove by. 
This is not to say that the Inuit lack a voice in the process. 
They participate in the NIRB process as deponents, NIRB panel 
members, and in the form of the Government of Nunavut’s own 
submissions. They vote for a Member of Parliament who has one 
of the 308 seats in the House of Commons, to which the federal 
government is responsible. They are assured by Article 26 of the 
NLCA that companies seeking to develop the North will 
recognize and respect their interests, with consideration in the 
form of Inuit Impact and Benefit Agreements (IIBAs).
145
 Most 
indispensably, they are landlords; NLCA beneficiaries hold title 
to nearly twenty percent (400,000 square kilometres) of 
Nunavut’s landmass, and subsurface rights to two percent 
(48,000 square kilometres).
146
 The Mary River project, for 
example, will operate under the terms of an IIBA and a lease 
negotiated by Baffinland with the Qikiqtani Inuit Association, 
the beneficiary corporation that represents the Inuit of Baffin 
Island.
147
 But none of this input—nor even the veto conferred by 
property ownership under the land claim—amounts to the legal 
jurisdiction that devolution would transfer from Ottawa to 
Nunavut.  
International law provides telling points of comparison. 
Article 26 of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP)
148
 provides in part that “[i]ndigenous people 
                                                 
145 NLCA, supra note 25, art. 26; see also FAQ, BAFFINLAND, 
http://www.baffinland.com/people-careers/faq/?lang=en (last visited Sept. 19, 
2013) (explaining the IIBA for the Mary River project). 
146 See Fact Sheet, supra note 124. 
147 See FAQ, supra note 145. 
148 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. 
Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/61/L.67 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP]. 
Canada endorsed UNDRIP as a non-binding, “aspirational” document in 2010. 
Canada’s Statement of Support on the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Aboriginal Aff. & N. Dev. Can., 
http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1309374239861/1309374546142 (last 
modified Jul. 30, 2012). Though UNDRIP is “soft law,” it is also evidence of 
an emerging norm of customary international law. See generally S. James 
Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples 79-82 (2009) 
(discussing the role of U.N. declarations in the formation of customary 
international law); see also Lorie M. Graham & Siegfried Wiessner, Indigenous 
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have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, 
territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional 
ownership or other traditional occupation or use.”149 It would be 
tough to argue that either the NCLA or the Nunavut Act gives the 
Inuit sufficient “control” over their “lands, territories and 
resources” to fulfill UNDRIP’s command. To begin with, “the 
lands, territories and resources that [the Inuit of Nunavut] 
possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional 
occupation or use” would extend, by almost any definition, well 
beyond the less than twenty percent of the territory over which 
the Inuit hold collective fee-simple title under the NLCA.
150
 
Even that twenty percent is nonetheless under the federal 
                                                                                                 
Sovereignty, Culture, and International Human Rights Law, 110 S. Atlantic Q. 
403, 406 (2011) (“[D]espite its status as a declaration, [UNDRIP] is poised to 
be a jurisprudentially and politically useful tool in the ongoing struggles of 
indigenous peoples. Yet considerable amounts of uncertainty remain.”). Several 
of UNDRIP’s provisions bear directly on indigenous rights in the Arctic, 
including Article 3 (“Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. 
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”), Article 18 
(“Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters 
which would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves 
in accordance with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop 
their own indigenous decision- making institutions.”), Article 19 (“States shall 
consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned 
through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior 
and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or 
administrative measures that may affect them.”), and Article 26 (see infra note 
149). 
149 UNDRIP, supra note 148, art. 26. In full, Article 26 reads: 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the 
lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally 
owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired. 
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, 
use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources 
that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other 
traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they 
have otherwise acquired. 
3. States shall give legal recognition and 
protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such 
recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the 
customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the 
indigenous peoples concerned. 
150 See Cécile Pelaudeix, Inuit Governance in a Changing Environment: 
A Scientific or a Political Project?, in WHAT HOLDS THE ARCTIC TOGETHER? 
67, 74 (Cécline Pelaudeix et al. eds. 2011). 
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government’s ultimate jurisdiction when it comes to decisions 
pertaining to land and resources. It is true that Canadian courts 
use the term “territory” in a far more limited sense than the 
UNDRIP does,
151
 but this need not diminish our ability to apply 
the Inuit right self-government to Nunavut; recall that, under 
Canadian law, the right to self-government is tied to indigenous 
peoples, not to particular tracts of territory.
152
 
In its historic 2001 Awas Tingni decision,
153
 the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights held that: 
 
Indigenous groups, by the fact of their very existence, 
have the right to live freely in their own territory; the 
close ties of indigenous people with the land must be 
recognized and understood as the fundamental basis 
of their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and 
their economic survival.
154
 
 
The Court rested its decision on Article 21 of the American 
Convention of Human Rights,
155
 rather than on non-codified 
principles of international law. (Article 21 of the Convention 
protects property rights.) Even so, as Siegfried Wiessner has 
                                                 
151 See, e.g., William v. British Columbia, [2012] BCCA 285, para. 220 
(Can. B.C. C.A.) (“Aboriginal title cannot generally be proven on a territorial 
basis, even if there is some evidence showing that the claimant was the only 
group in a region or that it attempted to exclude outsiders from what it 
considered to be its traditional territory.”). 
152 See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
153 The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001). 
154 Id. at ¶ 149. 
155 See American Convention on Human Rights Pact of San Jose, Costa 
Rica art. 21, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 17955 (referencing the Pact’s 
adoption at the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights, San 
José, Costa Rica, 22 November 1969). Article 21 of the Convention reads: 
1. Everyone has the right to the use and 
enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate such use 
and enjoyment to the interest of society. 
2. No one shall be deprived of his property 
except upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of 
public utility or social interest, and in the cases and according 
to the forms established by law. 
3. Usury and any other form of exploitation of 
man by man shall be prohibited by law. 
Id. 
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explained, the Court’s interpretation of this treaty provision is 
best understood in terms of a broader normative shift among 
states in their understanding of indigenous rights under 
international law.
156
 Professor Wiessner cites Chief Justice A.O. 
Conteh of the Supreme Court of Belize, who determined in 2007 
that “both customary international law and general international 
law would require that Belize respect the rights of its indigenous 
people to their lands and resources.”157 
Awas Tingni was the first decision by an international 
tribunal to recognize the land and resource rights of indigenous 
peoples in the face of adverse state action.
158
 The decision should 
be understood as part of a broader move in customary 
international law towards recognition of Aboriginal land and 
resource rights. If we understand the NLCA and the 
establishment of Nunavut as steps towards the vindication of the 
Inuit right to self-government, then these Canadian 
developments belong on the same trajectory.
159
 So does 
devolution; if the territorial government is an appropriate vessel 
for Inuit self-government in Canada’s Eastern Arctic—and this 
Article has argued that it is—then devolving decision-making 
over lands and resources from Ottawa to Nunavut is consistent 
with the development of international law. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) provides further support for indigenous rights under 
international law. In Ominayak v. Canada,
160
 the Human Rights 
Committee cited Article 27 of the Covenant
161
 to find in favour 
                                                 
156 Siegfried Wiessner, The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
Achievements and Continuing Challenges, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 137 (2011). 
157 Id.  
158 See S. James Anaya & Claudio Grossman, The Case of Awas Tingni 
v. Nicaragua: A Step in the International Law of Indigenous Peoples, 19 ARIZ. 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 2 (2002). 
159 See Siegfried Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in 
Light of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 41 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1141, 1170 (2008); Wiessner, supra note 156, at 135. 
160 Human Rights Committee Commc’n No. 167/1984, U.N. GAOR, 45th 
Sess., Supp. No. 40, (Vol. II), at 1, U.N. Doc. A/45/40, Annex 9(A) (Mar. 26, 
1990). 
161 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, entered 
into force Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Mar. 23, 1976 ) (“In those States 
in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to 
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of a First Nation that disputed the Canadian government’s 
decision to permit the Government of Alberta to expropriate 
indigenous lands for private purposes. The Committee’s decision 
in Ominayak has come to stand for its willingness not to be 
deferential in its review of state action affecting indigenous 
groups when dealing with cases brought through its individual 
complaints mechanism.
162
 It is also a notable example of how 
international law can support indigenous resistance to state 
action when a state’s decisions affect indigenous territory. 
Indigenizing decision-making through self-government—and, in 
Nunavut, achieving self-government through devolution—is an 
obvious means of avoiding such conflicts.
163
 
As Claire Charters has argued, “[b]y utilizing and 
referencing international law on the rights of Indigenous 
peoples—framing local, regional, national and international 
issues in terms of their conformity to international legal 
standards—that law will become embedded in international and 
domestic legal systems and legal psyches.”164 The indigenous 
rights case for devolution in Nunavut is an opportunity for 
precisely this sort of norm integration. 
As long as the Government of Nunavut—Canada’s lone 
indigenous territory—remains formally on the sidelines of the 
decisions that affect its own lands and resources, its Inuit 
inhabitants will await the true fulfilment of their rights as 
                                                                                                 
such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other 
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their 
own religion, or to use their own language.”). 
162 See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
256 (2004). 
163 Arctic indigenous peoples seeking to enforce their rights under the 
ICCPR may also look to the non-discrimination provisions of Article 2, or even 
the right “[t]o take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives,” under Article 25. Though the Inuit of Nunavut 
elect an MP who sits in the federal Parliament, this is a lesser degree of 
democratic participation in decision-making than that enjoyed by Canadian 
citizens in any other jurisdiction. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. In 
addition to undermining Article 25, this imbalance could also constitute the sort 
of discrimination that Article 2 prohibits. 
164 Claire Charters, Indigenous Peoples and International Law and 
Policy, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE LAW: COMPARATIVE AND CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 191 (Benjamin J. Richardson et al. eds., 2009). 
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indigenous peoples. Vindicating the indigenous rights of 
Nunavummiut through devolution is a crucial step towards, in 
Premier Aariak’s words, “completing the map of Canada”: 
 
Should the people who have lived on this land, as the 
stewards of the land for generations not have the same 
power to make decisions as other Canadians? This 
would be in keeping with the Inuit principle of 
ᓇᒻ ᒥᓂᖅ ᒪᑭᑕᔪᓐᓇᕐ ᓂᖅ, or self-reliance. And this 
is why Nunavut is actively seeking a devolution 
agreement—so that political and economic 
development can move forward in step with each 
other.
165
 
 
The case for an indigenous right to devolution in Nunavut 
thus ends where it began, with the Inuit’s simple, familiar, 
fundamentally Canadian—and human—desire to be maîtres chez 
nous.
166
 
 
III.  DEVOLUTION AND ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY 
 
This Article began by describing the basic inequality among 
members of the Canadian federation, in which only Nunavut 
lacks jurisdiction over its own lands and resources. Subsequent 
sections explained why the Inuit right to self-government—
viewed through the bifocal lens of Canadian and international 
law—demands the devolution of land and resource jurisdiction 
from Canada’s federal government to the Government of 
Nunavut. We conclude by canvassing a different dimension of 
international law; this Part argues that devolution will bolster 
Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. 
                                                 
165 Aariak, supra note 63. 
166 See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. Though this Article has 
focused on the rights dimension of devolution in Nunavut, it also has enormous 
resource implications, which doubtless figure prominently in the private 
deliberations of both the Government of Canada and the Government of 
Nunavut on their respective approaches to the devolution file. For a discussion 
of the fiscal implications of devolution, and a comparison to the parallel 
process in Greenland, see Anthony Speca, Nunavut, Greenland and the Politics 
of Resource Revenues, POL’Y OPTIONS, May 2012, at 62, available at 
http://archive.irpp.org/po/archive/may12/speca.pdf. 
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A. Indigenous Rights, International Law, and “Human 
Flagpoles” 
 
Inuit occupation has, for decades, been a central feature of 
Canadian claims to sovereignty in the Arctic. The NLCA 
confirms that “Canada's sovereignty over the waters of the arctic 
archipelago is supported by Inuit use and occupancy.”167 The 
federal government’s 2009 Northern Strategy168 concedes that 
“sovereignty over our Arctic lands and waters . . . is long-
standing, well-established and based on historic title, 
international law and the presence of Inuit and other Aboriginal 
peoples for thousands of years.”169 The basic claim is that 
Canada may assert sovereignty over the high Arctic because 
Canadians—Inuit Canadians—live there.  
But what if the Canadian citizens who occupy the high 
Arctic are denied the same complement of rights that Canadian 
citizens who live elsewhere take for granted? The citizenship gap 
that persists in the absence of devolution
170
 raises precisely this 
question. As it stands, the Inuit of the Eastern Arctic contribute 
directly to Canada’s assertion of sovereignty in the Arctic and 
receive only an incomplete bundle of rights in return.  
Canada’s dispute with the United States over the legal status 
of the Northwest Passage offers a case in point. Canada’s 
position is that the waters of the Passage are internal waters in 
which Canada may enforce its laws and deny passage to foreign 
vessels.
171
 The United States claims that the Passage is an 
                                                 
167 NLCA, supra note 25, art. 15. 
168 GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, CANADA’S NORTHERN STRATEGY: OUR 
NORTH, OUR HERITAGE, OUR FUTURE (2009),  
http://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/cns/cns.pdf [hereinafter Northern Strategy]. 
169 Id. 
170 See supra notes 164-184 and accompanying text. 
171 See generally Robert Dufresne, Canada and the United States: Arctic 
Sovereignty, PARLIAMENT OF CANADA, Dec. 2008, 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/prb0834_13-e.htm 
(summarizing the dispute and its implications). While Canada’s dispute with 
the United States over the status of the Northwest Passage is legally significant, 
it is not a source of real conflict; the two sides have simply agreed to disagree. 
Franklyn Griffiths, The Shipping News: Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty Not on 
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international strait, through which (and, in the case of aircraft, 
above which) foreign states enjoy a right of transit.
172
 When, in 
1970, a U.S.-registered oil tanker, the S.S. Manhattan, journeyed 
eastward from Alaska through the ice-bound Passage, a 
Canadian Inuit hunter drove his dog team into its path and 
stopped, forcing the massive Yankee vessel to do the same.
173
 As 
Terry Fenge has noted: 
 
The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act—
Canada’s prime response to the Manhattan incident—
invoked the need to protect the environment upon 
which Inuit depended out to 100 miles from the coast. 
In 1985 Inuvialuit as well as Canadian nationalists 
from the south were on board a small plane that 
buzzed the [U.S. Coast Guard vessel U.S.C.G.S.] 
Polar Sea dropping politically charged notes from the 
sky politely but firmly reminding the crew of 
Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. In the aftermath of the 
Polar Sea incident the late Mark R. Gordon, an Inuit 
leader from northern Quebec, said Inuit would hold 
up the Canadian flag in the Arctic. And still today 
Inuit leaders remain fully supportive of Canada’s 
Arctic sovereignty. Mary Simon, President of Inuit 
Tapiriit Kanatami, the national Inuit organization, 
conducted a Canada-wide tour late in 2007 to engage 
and inform Canadians on Arctic sovereignty and to 
gain public support for Inuit involvement in this 
issue.
174
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But the strategic importance of Inuit occupancy also has a 
dark history. Between 1953 and 1956, Canada’s federal 
government relocated some 19 Inuit families from Inukjuak, on 
the eastern shore of Hudson Bay, to the sites that are now the 
communities Grise Fjord, Nunavut and Resolute Bay, 
Nunavut—among the most remote permanent settlements in the 
circumpolar world.
175
 These “human flagpoles” were unwarned, 
unprepared, and undersupplied, separated from their families and 
the way of life they knew and understood.
176
 And then they were 
abandoned. 
There is some dispute as to the reasons for the relocation,
177
 
but none is more obvious than the assertion of Canadian 
sovereignty in the North.
178
 The descendants of those relocated 
families—along with tens of thousands of other Inuit—are still 
there, across the Arctic, Canadian citizens whose occupancy is 
the human foundation of Canada’s claims to sovereignty across 
the Far North. Fully implementing the NLCA and completing a 
devolution agreement with Nunavut could bolster Canadian 
security and sovereignty in the region.
179
 Yet, two decades after 
the NLCA was signed, its beneficiaries are pursuing a civil 
action against Canada, alleging failures of implementation,
180
 all 
while the federal government has dragged its feet on devolution. 
The children and grandchildren of the “human flagpoles” 
continue to be denied both the jurisdiction over lands and 
                                                 
175 Bruce Campion-Smith, Ottawa Apologizes to Inuit for Using Them as 
‘Human Flagpoles,’ TORONTO STAR (Aug. 18, 2010), available at 
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2010/08/18/ottawa_apologizes_to_inuit_f
or_using_them_as_human_flagpoles.html.  
176 Id. 
177 See Fenge, supra note 173. 
178 See Samantha Arnold, Nelvana of the North, Traditional Knowledge, 
and the Northern Dimension of Canadian Foreign Policy, 14 CANADIAN 
FOREIGN POL’Y J. 95, 105 (2008). 
179 See Tony Penikett, Arctic Security Means More than Arctic 
Sovereignty, GLOBE & MAIL (Jan. 26, 2011), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/arctic-security-means-more-
than-arctic-sovereignty/article563433/.  
180 See Nunavut Tunngavik, Inc. v. Canada, [2012] N.U.C.J. 11; Why is 
NTI Suing the Government of Canada?, NUNAVUT TUNNGAVIK INCORPORATED, 
http://www.tunngavik.com/documents/publications/2007-Naniiliqpita-
Spring.pdf.  
2013] Closing the Citizenship Gap In Canada’s North 59 
 
 
resources to which they are entitled as Canadian citizens and 
their right to self-government as indigenous peoples. 
If the watered-down citizenship of Nunavut’s inhabitants can 
be seen to weaken Canada’s claim to sovereignty based on 
occupancy, then devolution can be seen to strengthen it—
including over the very waters that are the subject of Canada’s 
disagreement with the United States. Remember that the 
Government of Nunavut has pressed for devolution to cover 
Nunavut’s internal waters, since the Inuit have long occupied not 
only the Arctic islands but also the sea ice in between.
181
 
Devolution would recognize this historic Inuit occupancy of the 
Northwest Passage in concrete legal terms, and this can only 
assist Canada’s sovereignty claim. As Cameron and Campbell 
argue: 
Canada’s jurisdiction over internal waters (as 
enclosed by the 1985 baselines), marine areas (as 
defined in the NLCA and the territorial sea) would be 
strengthened if Canada were to recognize the 
jurisdiction of the territorial government through the 
devolution of hydrocarbon and mineral resources in 
such areas. . . . Acceptance of the Government of 
Nunavut’s jurisdiction over . . . the marine areas 
defined in the land claims agreement, would be 
logical, and would have the further benefit of 
strengthening Canada’s sovereignty argument.
182
 
 
Even more simply, the devolution of broad resource-
management responsibilities over both land and marine bed 
resources to the Government of Nunavut would be a clear act of 
effective governance on the part of the federal government.
183
 It 
would mean, after all, that the federal government’s relationship 
with Nunavut would be functionally identical to its relationship 
with every other province or territory—as well as with the 
citizens of those provinces and territories. And, by more 
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completely expressing the indigenous right to self-government 
through Nunavut’s territorial government, Canada can further 
ground its sovereignty claim in the full indigenous history of the 
people of the North. Recall UNDRIP’s Article 26: “Indigenous 
peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources 
which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used 
or acquired.”184 By vindicating this right, and by further 
integrating emerging international indigenous rights norms
185
 
into the fabric of Canadian federalism, Canada can better use the 
Inuit’s traditional ownership and occupancy of the land and ice 
of the high Arctic to substantiate its sovereignty claim. 
When representatives of the five Arctic coastal nations met 
in Greenland in May 2008 to draft the Ilulissat Declaration
186—
which affirmed the principles of the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
187
 as the basis for 
resolving all outstanding Arctic maritime issues—they made no 
reference to emerging international law on the rights of 
indigenous peoples. To protest their exclusion from the Ilulissat 
gathering, the Inuit of Canada, Alaska, Russia, and Greenland 
issued A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the 
Arctic.
188
 As indigenous parties to treaties and other agreements 
with Arctic states, they asserted their right to be consulted about 
matters affecting their interests. Article 4.2 of the Declaration 
reads: “The conduct of international relations in the Arctic and 
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the resolution of international disputes in the Arctic are not the 
sole preserve of the Arctic states or other states, they are also 
within the purview of the Arctic's indigenous peoples.”189 The 
Inuit notion of sovereignty in the Arctic is one that includes 
indigenous peoples in their capacities as the owners of 
significant lands and resources, as regional governors, and as 
rights holders. If Canada embraces and expresses this view 
through devolution, it will only enhance its own claims to 
sovereignty over the Arctic archipelago and the straits and 
narrows of the Northwest Passage; if meaningful Inuit self-
government is achieved through Canadian federalism, then 
Canada may successfully adopt the indigenous argument for 
sovereignty as its own. As Suzanne Lalonde has suggested, 
“Inuit participation in the management and exploitation of land 
and marine bed resources within the Territory of Nunavut would 
reinforce Canada’s claim that its title over . . . Arctic waters . . . 
has been consolidated, and more importantly, that these waters 
are historic Canadian internal waters.”190 Nunavut’s Premier, 
meanwhile, has been even more blunt. For Canada to leave 
Nunavut, its only majority-indigenous jurisdiction, as “the only 
jurisdiction without control over its lands, internal waters and 
resources would be backsliding towards the paternalism and 
colonialism of the past,”191 she said in 2011. “As it stands,” she 
warned, “Nunavut is joined to the rest of Canada by only the 
thinnest of threads.”192 Paradoxically, the territory’s ties to the 
rest of the Canadian federation are weaker than those of any 
other jurisdiction because, in Nunavut alone, decision-making 
power is still centralized in Ottawa. Through devolution, the 
federal government may finally begin to end this inequality, and 
the citizenship gap that it creates. An empowered territorial 
government within the Canadian federation—whose constituents 
have called the Eastern Arctic home for millennia—offers a 
thicker basis for Canadian claims to sovereignty than does the 
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colonial vestige of federal control from Ottawa. If Nunavut, an 
expression of Inuit self-government, becomes a more equal 
participant in Canada’s federal system, then it will be better 
equipped to substantiate Canada’s claims to sovereignty in the 
high Arctic. As the Circumpolar Inuit Declaration states, “[t]he 
inextricable linkages between issues of sovereignty and 
sovereign rights in the Arctic and Inuit self-determination and 
other rights require states to accept the presence and role of Inuit 
as partners in the conduct of international relations in the 
Arctic.”193 
 
 B. Arctic Multilateralism and Inuit Self-Government 
 
By vindicating the rights of Inuit Nunavummiut, Canada can 
strengthen the ties that bind its northernmost territory to the rest 
of its people and strengthen its claims to sovereignty across the 
Far North. It can also ensure that its multilateral engagement 
with other Arctic states emphasizes the Inuit’s historic 
occupancy of the Eastern Arctic, to the same ends. 
Canada’s relationships with other Arctic states have rarely 
been adversarial, and what sovereignty concerns there are have 
largely been exaggerated. Canadian and American experts are 
commonly optimistic about the possibility of a win-win solution 
to Canada’s dispute with the United States over the offshore 
boundary between Yukon and Alaska in the oil-rich Beaufort 
Sea.
194
 Tensions between Canada and Denmark over Hans 
Island—a 1.3-square-kilometre piece of rock between Greenland 
and Ellesmere Island—remain unresolved, but the stakes are 
hardly high.
195
 And Canada has never had any real need to arm 
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itself military against other Arctic states; as Russia’s Arctic 
Ambassador, Anton Vasiliev, has stated, “[t]here are no issues 
between Arctic states that could call for a military solution.”196 
Canada has relied on cooperation with other Arctic states as 
the region has become increasingly interdependent. Next to 
Russia, Canada has the longest Arctic coastline, and yet has no 
deep-water Arctic port. Absent the assistance of other Arctic 
states, Canada has little capacity to respond to an air crash or a 
cruise ship disaster on its northern coastline.
197
 And, even during 
the Cold War, Canada never established a major military 
presence in the Arctic, in part “because it has always known it 
can rely on the U.S. to provide military might should it be 
required.”198 The question now is whether Canada is prepared to 
extend the scope of its circumpolar partnerships to include its 
own indigenous peoples. 
In May 2013, Canada assumed the Chair of the Arctic 
Council, a multilateral forum comprised of the eight Arctic 
states.
199
 The Government of Canada’s stated theme for its 
chairmanship, which lasts until 2015, is “Development for the 
People of the North.”200 In a forum that has included indigenous 
involvement since its inception,
201
 an indigenous rights claim for 
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devolution in Nunavut—against the backdrop of Canada’s 
broader efforts to secure its sovereignty in the Arctic—may well 
be difficult to ignore. 
In the 1996 Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic 
Council—known as “the Ottawa Declaration”—the Government 
of Canada and the other Arctic Council member states 
“affirm[ed their] commitment to the well-being of the inhabitants 
of the Arctic, including recognition of . . . indigenous people and 
their communities.”202 The Declaration designates six indigenous 
organizations as “Permanent Participants” in the Council.203 As 
Greenland’s former prime minister, Kuupik Kleist, told the 
Brookings Institution in April 2013, “the creation of the Arctic 
Council was initiated by the Arctic peoples themselves, the 
indigenous Arctic peoples, because we need . . . international 
cooperation” in the management of Arctic natural resources and 
the protection of Arctic ecosystems.
204
 
By elevating Nunavut’s status within Canada through 
devolution, and by presenting devolution as a means of 
achieving meaningful indigenous self-government in the Arctic, 
the federal government may well strengthen its position within 
the Arctic Council at a time when indigenous participation is 
becoming indispensible. True, there has been a persistent lack of 
consensus as to whether the Arctic Council’s indigenous 
Permanent Participants should sit at the same council table as the 
representatives of member states,
205
 and indigenous groups’ 
demands for enjoy equal voting rights in Council deliberations, 
alongside member states,
206
 have not been heeded. Yet, moves to 
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convene Arctic coastal states without the presence of indigenous 
representatives have been met with vocal resistance from Arctic 
Council members, most notably the United States; when Canada 
hosted a meeting of the “Arctic Five”—Canada, the United 
States, Russia, Norway, and Denmark—in 2010 and did not 
invite indigenous groups to participate, then-U.S. Secretary of 
State of Hillary Clinton objected publicly.
207
 Devolution would 
be a striking move away from past indigenous exclusion; by 
localizing decisions about lands and resources in Nunavut, and 
by achieving effective Inuit self-government through the 
territory’s institutions of public government, Canada would give 
Inuit Nunavummiut a seat at the table as jurisdiction-holders and 
decision-makers. Devolution would thus help to establish 
Canada as a leader on indigenous rights in a region where 
multilateralism is increasingly important. As circumpolar 
economic activity intensifies, and as international indigenous 
rights norms become more deeply embedded, Canada can use 
devolution to demonstrate cutting-edge engagement with a core 
Arctic governance issue, and this can only make its sovereignty 
claims more resonant. 
Nunavut is seeking devolution at a moment of enormous 
change in the Arctic. This Article has presented that process—as 
well as Nunavut’s very existence as a separate territory—as an 
effort to achieve meaningful Inuit self-government in Canada’s 
Eastern Arctic. Canadian law, international indigenous rights 
norms, and Canada’s geostrategic interests all point in the same 
direction, towards a fundamental act of decolonization: the 
closing of the citizenship gap in Canada’s North. By recognizing 
that the Inuit of Nunavut, through the territorial government for 
which they negotiated, ought to decide for themselves how their 
lands and resources are to be exploited or conserved, Canada 
may begin to extend to Nunavummiut the same jurisdictional 
power that is presently enjoyed by Canadian citizens in every 
other province and territory. This Article has argued that, until 
Canada takes this step, its federation will remain unfinished. 
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